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 Eating is a gendered act. In Western cultural mythology, men have rapacious 
appetites that cannot be easily satisfied; they require ‘substantial’ foods (like meat 
and potatoes) to keep up their strength and satisfy their hunger. 1 Hearty con-
sumption demonstrates a man’s virility and reinforces his masculinity. Women, 
on the other hand, have appetites that can easily be satisfied with low-calorie, 
low-fat foods (like fruits, vegetables, and diet drinks); according to popular cul-
tural myths, they live in constant danger of weight gain and loss of attractiveness 
if they indulge these minimal appetites. Furthermore, while men are encour-
aged to indulge and take pride in their appetites—whether it be for food, sex, or 
power—women are taught to tightly repress their hunger, focusing instead on 
satisfying the appetites of others. 2 
 Food is also frequently gendered. 3 Meat, in particular, is construed as ‘male’ 
food, with nonfat yogurt, meatless salads, and other ‘light’ fare cast as ‘female.’ 4 
So strong is the connection of meat with men and male power, in fact, that femi-
nist theorist Carol Adams calls meat  the symbol of the patriarchy and argues that 
the struggle to overcome male oppression must include moving away from eat-
ing meat. “How [can] we overthrow patriarchal power while eating its symbol?” 
she asks. “Autonomous, antipatriarchal being is clearly vegetarian. To destabilize 
patriarchal consumption we must interrupt patriarchal meals of meat” (200). 5 
Adams is hardly alone in taking this stance: Other prominent feminists such as 
Greta Gaard, Lori Gruen, Marti Kheel, and Catharine MacKinnon also argue 
that rejecting the consumption of animals and animal products is an impor-
tant step in overcoming patriarchal structures and consequent environmental 
injustices. 6 
 The ecofeminist argument for veganism is powerful. Meat consumption is 
a deeply gendered act that is closely tied to the systematic objectification of 
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women and nonhuman animals. Nevertheless, I have concerns about advocat-
ing veganism that involve its effectiveness in destabilizing patriarchal injustices. 
In particular, I am concerned that presenting veganism as  the moral ideal might 
reinforce rather than alleviate the disordered status quo in gendered eating—that 
it might actually further disadvantage women in existing power structures. In 
this chapter, I explain these concerns, and I advocate a feminist account of ethi-
cal eating that treats dietary choices as moral choices insofar as they constitute 
an integral part of our relationships to ourselves and to others. 7 I argue that we 
should think of dietary choices in Aristotelian moral terms as a mean  relative to 
us , falling on a continuum between the vice of doing injustice to ourselves, on 
the one hand, and the vice of doing injustice to others, on the other. On this 
view, what it is moral to eat for individuals is not a fixed ideal, but rather depends 
on particulars of our physiological, psychological, economic, cultural, and rela-
tional situations. 
 Objectification and Linked Oppressions 
 The claim that women are consistently objectified in a morally problematic 
way is perhaps more widely accepted in feminist writing than any other single 
claim. 8 This objectification is often linked to a dualist framework that opposes, 
for example, rational to emotional, active to passive, subject to object, culture to 
nature, mind to body. As political theorist Carol Cohn observes, 
 in this symbolic system, human characteristics are dichotomized, divided 
into pairs of polar opposites that are supposedly mutually exclusive. . . . 
In each case, the first term of the “opposites” is associated with male, the 
second with female. And in each case, our society values the first over the 
second. (364) 9 
 The negative consequences of perceiving woman as Other and Object have been 
seen as encompassing everything from sexual violence to eating disorders to 
persistent economic, legal, and political inequality. 10 
 As numerous theorists have gone on to point out, moreover, women are 
alone neither in being objectified nor in being oppressed by that objectifica-
tion. Adams, for instance, grounds her feminist-vegetarian critical theory on the 
observation that “women and animals are similarly positioned in a patriarchal 
world, as objects rather than subjects” (180). 11 Indeed, the processes of learning 
to ignore the subjective presence of someone and to make use of a ‘someone’ 
as a ‘some thing ’ are disturbingly parallel in the cases of women and animals. As 
Catharine MacKinnon describes this process, 
 women in male-dominated society are identified as nature, animalistic, 
and thereby denigrated, a maneuver that also defines animals’ relatively 
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lower rank in human society. Both are seen to lack properties that elevate 
men, those qualities by which men value themselves and define their status 
as human by distinction. (264) 12 
 Men have been consistently advantaged in ways that allowed them to identify as, 
say, rational and active, and to code those qualities as the ‘positive’ qualities in 
an oppositional dualistic framework. In a position to ignore and/or subvert the 
self-identification and subjective experience of other groups, men came to view 
themselves as agents acting on and over the rest of the world. Over time, the 
stability of male domination has led to the systematic objectification of women, 
nonhuman animals, and the environment. 13 
 One of the most stable features in this patriarchal system (across cultures and 
over time) is meat consumption as a sign of male power. But the issue does not 
involve merely the consumption of dead animal bodies. The use of animals for 
their products can also be seen as an act of male domination—especially dairy 
products and eggs, which must come from female bodies. As Adams puts it, 
“A corollary and prelude to animalized protein is  feminized protein : milk and 
eggs . . . Female animals become oppressed by their femaleness . . . [Then] when 
their productiveness ends, they are butchered and become animalized protein” 
(91). The consumption not just of animals but also of their products thus appears 
to reinforce patterns of male oppression. 
 In this context, veganism has sometimes been promoted as an important act 
of protest. In particular, theorists who adopt a ‘linked oppressions’ model argue 
that sexism and speciesism are related in such a way that refraining from the 
consumption of animals and their products is a vital step in undercutting patterns 
of patriarchal power and benefitting women and nonhuman animals. 14 Rather 
than being treated as “independent, discrete forms of oppression,” the systemic 
disadvantaging of women and animals should be treated as a “bundled politi-
cal problem” (Wykoff 2). According to this view, advocated by Adams, Gaard, 
Gruen, Kheel, and MacKinnon, among others, ignoring the interconnections 
between the oppression of women and nonhuman animals can lead to people 
advocating policies and behaviors that inadvertently exacerbate rather than alle-
viate the problem. Recognizing the link between these forms of oppression, on 
the other hand, allows us to advocate for positive change that affects everyone. 
As Jason Wykoff writes, 
 whenever two forms of oppression A and B are linked, it is  at least likely, 
if not necessary, that the liberation of those who are oppressed through 
A will be accompanied by the liberation of those who are oppressed 
through B. (4) 
 In Adams’s words, “feminist-vegetarian activity declares that an alternative 
worldview exists, one which celebrates life rather than consuming death” (197). 
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 Idealism, Agency, and Eating 
 The valorization of the vegan lifestyle as a means of destabilizing patriarchal val-
ues often connects such a lifestyle with knowledge, life, and peace—and a meat-
eating lifestyle with ignorance, death, and war. Adams, for instance, explicitly 
calls for “the positing of an ideal world composed of vegetarianism, pacifism, 
and feminism as opposed to a fallen world of women’s oppression, war, and 
meat eating” (133), and contrasts veganism as a “culture of life” that can (and 
should) replace the current phallocentric, corpse-consuming “culture of death.” 
Although not essential to the strategy of destabilizing unjust patriarchal systems, 
the equation of veganism with such positive qualities is prevalent in many dis-
cussions of the topic. 
 This contrast is rhetorically effective in making veganism appealing. At the 
same time, it echoes the dualistic division of reality that opposes attributes of 
the transcendent, ‘pure’ mind, soul, or spirit to those of the immanent, corrupt 
body—the same dualism that has led to the consistent devaluation of the body, 
which has been associated with ignorance, death, and war since the time of 
Plato. 15 This dualism and its negative portrayal of the body has had particularly 
harmful consequences for women, however, who have been traditionally associ-
ated with the body and all its negative characteristics. 16 
 The claim that feminists should transcend ‘the negative’ by refusing to eat 
bodies—to consume corruption and death—should not, then, be understood in 
separation from the broader cultural context of the association of women with 
bodies and all their attendant negative qualities. As Cohn argues, 
 this system of dichotomies is encoding many meanings that may be quite 
unrelated to male and female bodies. Yet once that first step is made—the 
association of each side of those lists with a gender—gender now becomes 
tied to many other kinds of cultural representations. (364) 17 
 The association of bodies with ignorance, death, violence—and women—runs 
too deep to be ignored or easily subverted. In fact, taken in this context, the 
connection of veganism with qualities like knowledge, life, and peace in explicit 
contrast to their opposites runs the danger of underscoring rather than under-
mining the somatophobia (body loathing) that is one of the hallmarks of the 
patriarchy. This consequence should give pause to anyone who rejects the idea 
that female liberation should involve distancing oneself from or transcending 
one’s physicality. 18 
 The dichotomy between male ‘oppressor’ and female and animal ‘oppressed,’ 
male ‘subject’ and female and animal ‘object’ that underlies much work in second-
wave and eco-feminism is also subject to critique. First, the portrayal of men 
as agents who exercise domination over women and animals belies the much 
more complicated lived experience of most men, including those in privileged 
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positions. 19 Second, this dichotomy’s emphasis on the parallel positionality of 
women and nonhuman animals masks important differences between how 
women and animals fare in the patriarchy. There is a disanalogy between the 
way that women are exploited as sex objects and animals are exploited for food, 
moreover, that proves crucial for both understanding and resisting the complex 
power dynamics of the patriarchy—namely, unlike the animals who are killed 
or exploited for their products, women are often enthusiastic participants in the 
systems that disadvantage them. Downplaying this difference ignores the subjec-
tivity of women and the role they play in sustaining and perpetuating patriarchal 
structures. 
 Take, for example, the restaurant chain Hooters, whose gimmick is female 
servers in tight tank tops and short shorts, and whose slogan is an owl with 
breasts for eyes emblazoned with the phrase “More Than a Mouthful.” Adams 
sees this as an example of ‘anthropornography,’ where animals are objectified as 
edible beings in the same context that women are objectified as sexual beings. 
In her account, Beth Dixon observes, “Adams collapses the differences between 
animal intentionality and human intentionality” (190) in order to highlight the 
similarities between them. 20 Yet the objectified animals served up at the restau-
rant as burgers, wings, and such were given no say in the situation, whereas the 
objectified women who serve them actively chose that position. Competition 
among women for jobs as servers at Hooters tends to be fierce: For one thing, 
you can expect higher tips there than at most ‘family-friendly’ establishments. In 
general, women often gain tangible benefits from actively participating in their 
own objectification, including increased wages, social status, and self-confidence. 
The fact that the same system that confers these benefits also undercuts their pos-
sibilities in other areas makes those advantages no less real or desirable for those 
women. 21 
 Adams, Gruen, Kheel, and others may well be right that sexism and specie-
sism are oppressions that are linked in significant ways. 22 My focus in this chapter 
is the more specific claim that rejecting the consumption of animals and animal 
products is an important (perhaps necessary) step in destabilizing this system. 
And—as Nancy Bauer, who has written extensively about feminism and the 
phenomenon of female self-objectification, demonstrates—attempts to change 
systems that don’t take seriously the reasons that people participate in appar-
ently harmful activities tend to fail or even backfire. 23 In this particular case, 
it is important not to ignore the agency of women who are involved in their 
objectification, or to treat them as victims of the patriarchy in the same way that 
animals who are used for their products and/or slaughtered for consumption are 
victims. 
 In addition, we need to be sensitive to the ways in which advocating vegan-
ism as a feminist ideal interacts with existing norms for women’s eating and 
appetites. The refusal of adolescent women to eat—especially to eat meat—has 
sometimes been read by feminists as an empowered (if unconscious) opposition 
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to patriarchy. Susie Orbach, for instance, has argued that anorexia can be read 
as a feminist ‘hunger strike’; it silently protests the demand to repress female 
appetite by carrying it to its logical (and visibly harmful) extreme. 24 Observing 
that oppressed or marginalized groups often turn to nonverbal forms of protest 
in situations where verbal resistance can lead to recrimination, Carol Adams 
also discusses ‘meat phobia’ as a phenomenon that might symbolize young girls’ 
rejection of the phallocracy via their food choices. She suggests that these women 
can be seen as practicing feminism, “coding their criticism of the prevailing 
world order in the choice of female-identified foods” (175). On Adams’s account, 
where meat eating is “the” symbol of the patriarchy, the refusal to eat meat is 
likely to look like a refusal to participate in that system. 
 This interpretation of teenaged girls’ rejection of meat and animals products 
seems to me, however, worryingly disconnected from an understanding of how 
this refusal fits into broader cultural attitudes towards female appetite and con-
sumption. The standard myth of female eating—which is exemplified in the 
lives of anorexics—effectively prohibits regular female consumption of ‘male-
identified’ foods such as meat by linking it to weight gain and a corresponding 
loss of sexual attractiveness. (Adams herself points out that ‘female-identified’ 
foods are typically lower in calories, fat, and protein than ‘male-identified’ 
foods.) In this context, the act of ‘refusing the male order in food’ by rejecting 
meat, eggs, and dairy products is an act that  reinforces existing cultural norms sur-
rounding female consumption. For girls who rigidly conform to social norms of 
female eating and who deny themselves the food rich in protein and fat that their 
developing bodies require, “the protest collapses into its opposite and proclaims 
the utter capitulation of the subject to the contracted female world” (Bordo 
176). 25 Women who display disordered attitudes towards physical embodiment 
and/or their own sexuality by avoiding male-identified foods seem to be par-
ticipating in more than protesting the patriarchal status quo. Indeed, there is 
some concern in the medical community that at times “vegetarian diets may be 
selected to camouflage an existing eating disorder.” 26 
 Women avoiding male-identified foods is the  norm for sexist myths of gen-
dered eating, not the exception. Women are meant to monitor their food con-
sumption closely, feel guilty about consuming the ‘wrong’ foods, and satisfy 
their appetites primarily with fruits, vegetables, and grains. It is unclear how 
making veganism a moral ideal would destabilize these norms. For one thing, 
the women who participate in this protest will be indistinguishable from those 
who are simply participating in disordered patterns of gendered eating. Fur-
thermore, on the global level, women in situations of food scarcity often allow 
(or encourage) men to consume what little meat is available, cooking and 
serving it to the adult males while depriving themselves—even if these women 
perform more physical labor daily than their male counterparts, and even if 
they are pregnant and/or lactating. These practices lead to a disproportionate 
number of women dying of starvation in famine situations. 27 Again, it is not 
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clear how advocating veganism as a specifically feminist moral ideal would 
undercut these realities. 
 The argument for feminist veganism must, I think, be taken in the larger 
context of these long-standing, deeply entrenched gendered eating norms. And, 
in this context, it is difficult to see how the act of feminists refraining from the 
consumption of animals and their products will destabilize the current system of 
objectification and oppression in the way that Adams et al. believe it will. 
 Moral Ideals and Second-Class Citizens 
 To this point, I have concentrated on how the case for veganism as a feminist 
moral ideal interacts with existing norms of gendered eating. In this section, I 
turn to the question of how people fare on this account who cannot meet (or 
who struggle to meet) this ideal for physiological, economic, or other reasons. 
There are two common responses to these situations: The first is to grant an 
exception to the moral rule to those people; the second is to bite the bullet and 
claim that those people are forced to behave immorally—and accept that this 
is a regrettable consequence of some people’s suboptimal situations. My worry 
with the first response is that the people who need these exceptions tend to be 
those already most disadvantaged by the current system, and that giving them 
moral excuses thus reinforces their status as ‘second-class’ citizens. My worry 
with the second is that it has the effect of rendering those already disadvantaged 
people  immoral second-class citizens, and that we should object to a moral theory 
that turns disadvantage into immortality. My response to these concerns is not 
to reject the idea that dietary choices are moral choices, however, but rather 
to argue (in the following sections) for an account in which there is no ‘one’ 
ideal for ethical eating but rather individual ideals based on particulars of our 
situations. 
 The American Dietetic Association has judged that 
 appropriately planned vegetarian diets, including total vegetarian or vegan 
diets . . . are appropriate for individuals during all stages of the life cycle, 
including pregnancy, lactation, infancy, childhood, and adolescence, and 
for athletes. 28 
 That is, there are no blanket health considerations that rule out veganism as a 
potentially healthy diet for human beings. At the same time, it is vital for veg-
etarian or vegan diets to be “appropriately planned.” As the same primary author 
of the ADA report (W. J. Craig) writes in another report specifically on the 
health consequences of vegan diets, 
 eliminating all animal products from the diet increases the risk of certain 
nutritional deficiencies. Micronutrients of special concern for the vegan 
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include vitamins B-12 and D, calcium, and long-chain n-3 (omega-3) fatty 
acids. Unless vegans regularly consume foods that are fortified with these 
nutrients, appropriate supplements should be consumed. In some cases, 
iron and zinc status of vegans may also be of concern because of the lim-
ited bioavailability of these minerals. 29 
 For our purposes, there are two things to note about these reports. First, the 
specific micronutrients at issue in a vegan diet—especially calcium, iron, and 
zinc—are ones that women are more ‘nutritionally vulnerable’ with respect to 
than men. And the extent to which women are nutritionally vulnerable with 
respect to these nutrients varies over their lifecycle (puberty, menstruation, preg-
nancy, lactation, perimenopause, menopause, post-menopause). This in no way 
implies that vegan diets are inappropriate for women. What it does mean is 
that women need to be more careful about their intake and absorption of these 
micronutrients on a vegan diet than men do. Second, whether women (and men) 
are in a position to put the time, money, energy, education, and other resources 
into adopting a healthy vegan diet depends on their individual situations. The 
ones who are most likely to be able to dedicate themselves to this lifestyle are 
people in situations of abundance and who are able to adopt this diet with relative 
physiological, psychological, economic, and social ease. The people most likely 
to be able to do this tend to be wealthy men in industrialized countries. Mak-
ing veganism a moral ideal would require groups that are already economically, 
socially, and politically disadvantaged to exert a greater amount of time, energy, 
and resources to living a moral life than those who are already advantaged. 
 One response to this state of affairs is to grant those disadvantaged people 
moral ‘passes’ for being unable to live up to the moral ideal. Yet, in addition to 
being viewed as morally subpar by others, people who require excuses from the 
vegan moral ideal would also be likely to internalize their moral ‘failings’ in the 
form of feelings of guilt and inferiority, and to view those who can live up to 
that ideal as morally superior. 
 Imagine an analogous case in which a person, Devin, believes he has a moral 
obligation to give money to charity on a regular basis. Devin has, however, 
recently lost his job and is struggling to make ends meet—selling plasma just to 
pay rent and buy groceries. Most people are inclined to grant Devin an excuse 
from that moral obligation and to claim that his inability to meet that require-
ment does not compromise his moral character. 
 Now, imagine the effects of this exception from the perspective of both 
Devin and his community: First, even if Devin fully recognizes that he is not 
obligated in these circumstances to continue donating money to charity, if he 
has internalized this moral rule (and we’re supposing that he’s a sensitive moral 
agent who takes his obligation to donate money seriously) he is highly likely to 
struggle with feelings of inferiority and guilt for not being able to act in accor-
dance with it. In addition, even if Devin’s community (which we’ll narrow just 
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to family, friends, and neighbors for simplicity’s sake) recognizes that Devin is 
excused from the moral rule in these circumstances, they’re still likely to judge 
him negatively (if, perhaps, unconsciously) for being unable to act in accordance 
with it—and, if they’re able to meet that moral requirement, they’re likely to 
view themselves as, in some sense, superior to Devin  even recognizing that he is 
not obligated to act in accordance with that rule . The situation becomes exacerbated 
over time; if Devin continues to struggle financially over the space of years, or 
even decades, he is increasingly likely to judge himself negatively for failing to 
be able to give money to charity, and his community is increasingly likely to 
view Devin as a subpar moral agent in that respect—again,  even if they believe 
that he is genuinely excused from charitable giving. Devin would, in practice, be 
reduced to a second-class moral citizen in this respect. 30 
 The parallel to the issue of moral veganism should be clear. Regardless of how 
we believe the people granted those exceptions are entitled to feel, or what we 
believe the people who aren’t granted such exceptions should believe about those 
who are excused from the moral rule, it seems almost certain that the actual fact 
of routinely excusing those groups of people from the vegan moral ideal would 
have the consequence of morally disadvantaging groups which are already disad-
vantaged in a number of other ways. This disadvantage is magnified by the fact 
that many of these people will require exceptions or excuses from the moral rule 
for the majority of their lives; their biological and/or socio-geopolitical circum-
stances will entail that they will  never be able to function in society as ideal moral 
agents. Claiming that this fact shouldn’t impact the way they view themselves or 
the way that others view them belies the realities of their situation. 
 Another response to the inequality of these moral demands is to argue that 
this disadvantage is a tragic result of unjust social structures, and to bite the bul-
let and claim that the people who are not able to meet the moral vegan ideal are 
morally subpar. The fact that certain unjust social structures force people to par-
ticipate in immoral acts is presented as further motivation to change those harm-
ful systems. This response seems even more problematic than the first, however. 
For one thing, it has an air of adding insult to injury. On this view, people who 
are for one reason or another unable to f lourish (physiologically, psychologically, 
economically, etc.) on a vegan diet are not just second-class citizens: They are 
 immoral second-class citizens that deserve our pity. This puts them in a category 
of moral disadvantage that would seem to build up rather than break down the 
various barriers between them and those who are morally privileged on this 
system. 
 I believe that we should, instead, think of dietary choices in terms of a mean 
 relative to us that falls on a continuum between doing injustice to ourselves, on 
the one hand, and doing injustice to others, on the other. According to this view, 
whether it is morally correct for us to engage in or to abstain from eating animals 
and/or animal products will depend on particulars of our individual physiologi-
cal, cultural, economic, and relational situations. 
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 Guiding Considerations 
 Several considerations guide the construction of my account. First, as I’ve already 
discussed, existing norms surrounding the consumption of meat are deeply gen-
dered. Rather than overturning patterns of male domination, a more likely result 
of self-identified feminists—who are predominantly women—rejecting meat 
and animal products in favor of ‘female-identified foods’ is the further reinforce-
ment of the current myths of male and female eating. As I’ve argued in detail 
elsewhere, more is at stake here than just what types of foods men and women 
eat: Patterns of meat-consumption are only one part of larger gendered patterns 
of appetite indulgence and repression that permeate Western culture. 31 Men are 
encouraged to indulge and take pride in their appetites for meat, for sex, and for 
power, and women are taught to tightly repress their appetites, focusing instead 
of satisfying the appetites of others. We should be extremely cautious in advis-
ing a group that is already predisposed towards harmful repression of appetite to 
further monitor and restrict its consumption. 
 Second, eating is a moral activity on my theory insofar as it necessarily 
involves acting in ways that exemplify a certain relationship both to oneself and 
to others. One of the most central (and frequent) activities in which we partici-
pate, eating is integrally involved in the shape of our lives, and in the shaping of 
our characters. Dietary choices—whether involving the consumption of animals 
and animal products or fair-trade practices and fossil fuel use in food production 
and distribution—are choices that directly impact human and nonhuman ani-
mal f lourishing on both an individual and community level. My account treats 
as moral a wide range of attitudes and behaviors not usually thought of as such, 
but I consider that an advantage rather than a detriment to my theory. To put a 
complex point very simply, we tend to focus all of our moral attention, energy, 
and outrage on a very narrow range of activities; in order to counteract systemic 
injustice, we need to adopt a broader ethical outlook. 
 Third, the widespread factory farming practices in the current meat, dairy, 
and egg industries strike me as morally indefensible. Any reasonable theory of 
ethical eating should advocate the elimination of such practices. Not only does 
it necessitate the suffering of the ‘farmed’ animals, but it also harms local envi-
ronments and contributes to imbalanced and unsustainable agricultural practices 
(monocropping for feed, the heavy use of pesticide in order to grow nonlocal 
plants, etc.). The same general difficulties face the factory farm dairy and egg 
industries. The main reason factory farming has become so prevalent in the last 
fifty years or so, however, is the increasing demand of the growing global popu-
lation for meat. In large parts of the industrialized world, factory farmed meat 
and animal products are the only sort available and/or affordable to the non-
wealthy who live in urban areas. ‘Free-range’ meat, milk, and eggs are, by and 
large, luxuries available only to the middle and upper classes, who thus gain the 
upper hand with respect to both moral and health considerations. Any concrete 
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steps towards eliminating factory farming, then, should also take into account 
negative effects such a move might have on the world’s economically disadvan-
taged and seek to alleviate those effects. 
 In summary, an adequate feminist account of ethical eating should seek to 
change the disordered reality of current gendered eating patterns, treat dietary 
choices 32 as moral choices insofar as they constitute an integral part of our rela-
tionships to ourselves and to others, and advocate the end of factory farming 
practices in ways that don’t further disadvantage the urban poor. 
 Finding the Mean for Ethical Eating 
 The basic structure of my account is Aristotelian: I think of morality in terms of 
the actions, attitudes, desires, and beliefs involved in developing and maintaining 
a good moral character, understood in a robust and meaningful sense. 33 In prac-
tical terms, this means that the vast majority of one’s everyday choices, actions, 
and desires—particularly those made on a regular or habitual basis—impact one’s 
character in such a way as to make one either a better or worse moral agent. 
 I also advocate Aristotle’s doctrine of the ‘mean relative to us’ with respect to 
moral virtues. 34 That is, I believe that Aristotle was correct in identifying virtue 
as a mean between two extremes—and that he was right in claiming that human 
beings do not share a common mean, but rather that where the moral mean falls 
for each person will be relative to us. In other words, what’s virtuous for an indi-
vidual person will depend (and vary) on their particular external circumstances, 
physical abilities and limitations, and so on. What’s more, this mean can (and 
will) change as the person’s circumstances change. To give a practical example, 
what bravery for me would look like in the face of an attempted mugging might 
be cowardly for my friend who’s a fourth-degree black belt, and what bravery for 
her would look like in the same situation might be recklessness for me. It is vital 
to stress in this connection that it is not a matter of my being  less brave than my 
friend, however, or of her being  more brave than me. Rather, this moral theory 
maintains that we can both exemplify bravery through different actions—and 
that it would be morally wrong for either of us to act according to the other’s 
mean. 
 With respect to the issue of ethical eating practices, then, I believe we should 
think of the moral mean as falling between the vice of doing injustice to oneself 
and the vice of doing injustice to others. In thinking about our dietary choices, 
we should take into consideration both what would facilitate our personal f lour-
ishing (physiologically, psychologically, economically, socially, etc.) and what 
would facilitate the f lourishing of those (both human and nonhuman) in our 
broader communities. 
 The effects of disordered gendered norms of eating are highly relevant in 
this context of evaluation. Doing justice to oneself in this case will include, 
for example, proper respect for our own well-being, which includes viewing 
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ourselves as having equal moral worth with others. Women have, traditionally, 
been discouraged from viewing themselves in this way. Instead, they have been 
encouraged to and rewarded for placing the well-being of others ahead of their 
own, denying their appetites in favor of indulging the appetites of those around 
them. They have also been taught to fear and repress hunger and to feel constant 
shame for eating. It would not be surprising, then, if many women needed to 
move more towards ‘doing justice to oneself.’ At the same time, doing justice to 
others will involve respect for their well-being, which includes viewing others as 
having equal moral worth as ourselves. Men have, traditionally, been encouraged 
to indulge their appetites without full regard for the impact their actions have on 
others. It would not be surprising, then, if many men needed to move closer to 
‘doing justice to others.’ 
 On this account, we should treat all animals (ourselves and others, human and 
nonhuman) with equal respect and with concern for their f lourishing as members 
of their natural kinds. Treating everyone with consideration for their f lourishing 
will, however, entail a dramatic change in current relationships between human 
and nonhuman species. We would need to shift from a focus on maximizing 
the quantity and/or quality of the products we get from the animals we have 
domesticated for their milk, eggs, and such, to genuine concern for promoting 
their f lourishing. Were we to make this shift, though, I do not believe that living 
in continued relationships with animals that also involve our consuming their 
products necessarily harms them. I find nothing inherently objectionable about 
the consumption of eggs, milk, and other dairy products, for instance, so long as 
the producing animals live in conditions that allow them to f lourish as members 
of their natural kinds. This will, however, entail a  drastic reduction in the amount 
of meat, dairy products, and eggs available for human consumption. 
 Indeed, one thing that seems certain—especially given the injustices of fac-
tory farming and the need to eliminate such practices—is that the mean for 
almost everyone who lives in wealthy, industrialized cultures will involve the 
reduction or complete elimination of meat and other animal products. In fact, 
it seems highly likely that the mean for those who are physiologically, psycho-
logically, and economically able to f lourish on diets that do not involve animal 
products will involve their doing so. 
 How this will play out in actual practice is complicated, however—and rightly 
so, for both our own lives and the way they intersect with the lives around us 
are highly complex. Take the case of Leah, who lives in a position of relative 
economic and social comfort, with a full-time career as a professional sociolo-
gist and primary responsibility for a young child. Leah is capable of f lourishing 
on a vegan diet without compromising her physical, psychological, or economic 
health, and she possesses sufficient resources to educate herself on how best to 
live a vegan lifestyle without its consuming undue amounts of time and energy. 
At the same time, as primary caregiver for her child, Skye, Leah possesses the 
responsibility to guarantee that her daughter’s nutritional needs are met. As a 
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fast-growing girl with a serious allergy to soy and an aversion to beans, kale, and 
other leafy green vegetables, Skye is not likely to f lourish on a vegan diet. Should 
Leah become a vegan but assume the burden of preparing meals for her daughter 
that include some animal products? Perhaps, in these circumstances, she should 
be vegetarian, meeting Skye’s nutritional needs with eggs and dairy products 
while minimizing her own consumption of those products. What is important 
to note, in any event, is that only she will have access to the full amount of infor-
mation that determines her mean. 
 Geographic considerations will also play a role in determining one’s mean. 
If one lives in Southern California, for instance, where the growing season is 
extended, and one has a backyard suitable for growing vegetables and fruits, one’s 
mean will likely be quite different from one who lives in downtown Cleveland. 
One’s mean can also change with one’s geographic and social circumstances. An 
individual from Maui whose mean in Hawaii is vegan might justly eat meat dur-
ing an extended stay in rural Mongolia, for instance, while someone from Sierra 
Leone whose mean is omnivorous there might justly abstain from eating meat 
and significantly reduce or eliminate her consumption of dairy products when 
she moves to Tokyo. 
 My view can be seen as a version of moral contextualism. It differs in at 
least one important way from versions of contextualism such as Deane Curtin’s, 
however. 35 Although Curtin advocates Contextual Moral Vegetarianism as one 
aspect of a broader program of nonviolence and does not present that program as 
a universal rule, Contextual Moral Vegetarianism still presents veganism as the 
ultimate moral ideal, even if not an appropriate lifestyle for everyone. But, as I 
argued earlier, this has the net effect of reducing those unable to meet the idea to 
second-class moral citizens. Thinking of moral ideal s (in the plural) as variable 
according to individuals avoids this effect. What counts as properly ethical eat-
ing for an individual person depends on what the mean relative to that person is, 
whether that involves abstaining entirely from meat and animal products, eating 
dairy products and eggs but not meat, eating fish but not other animals or animal 
products, and so on. 
 Veganism is not uniquely privileged on my account. Although this will be 
seen by some as a serious f law, in the context of current disordered gendered eat-
ing norms it has at least two distinct advantages. First, the immediate impact of 
a significant number of men becoming vegetarian or vegan would likely be to 
weaken that association of meat eating with men and masculinity. This weaken-
ing might well lead to a welcome shift in current myths of male and female eat-
ing, where the deeply entrenched identification of certain foods (such as meat) as 
masculine and other foods (such as salads and fruit) as feminine would gradually 
be deconstructed by actual practice. 
 Second, the fact that moral dietary choices can vary from individual to indi-
vidual and from situation to situation should work to prevent any one particular 
diet from becoming privileged over another. We usually have no direct access 
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to the mean relative to another person, and we would not be entitled to draw 
definite conclusions about someone’s moral character in that area without access 
to that person’s mean. Ideally, one of the long-term consequences of putting 
this account of ethical eating into practice would be that it would reduce the 
morally loaded attitudes that we currently hold towards eating—and that sig-
nificantly contribute to disordered eating. A woman’s choice of an ice cream 
sundae would not, for instance, automatically generate negative judgments about 
her will power and/or health status; a man’s choice of an Activia yogurt would 
not automatically generate negative judgments about his masculinity, since those 
around them would lack access to their means. In general, adopting a virtue-
ethics approach to ethical eating would seriously undermine the rigid—and 
highly gendered—moral judgments that currently guide our thinking about 
what other people around us should or should not be eating. 
 This outcome seems deeply desirable to me. Our primary job as moral agents 
is not, after all, to police the behavior of those around us (except in the case of 
the very small number of people to whom we have special relations of account-
ability); it is to work as best we can to optimize the health of the relations we 
have both to ourselves and to our communities, to f lourish as human beings 
individually and in relation to others. 36 
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